{"id":224779,"date":"2026-09-07T17:38:14","date_gmt":"2026-09-07T17:38:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/neodata.com.uy\/labs\/?page_id=224779"},"modified":"2026-09-07T23:11:40","modified_gmt":"2026-09-07T23:11:40","slug":"in-practice","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/neodata.com.uy\/labs\/in-practice\/","title":{"rendered":"In Practice"},"content":{"rendered":"

\/\/ Field_Implementations<\/h2>\n<\/div><\/div><\/div>
<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n
\n
\n
\n
\"A<\/span><\/a>

A card migration is a state machine.<\/a><\/h2>

2026<\/span><\/p>

Moving a live fare system from MIFARE Classic to MIFARE Plus is not a card replacement exercise. It is a controlled transition across credentials, readers, keys and operational states.<\/p>\n<\/div>read more...<\/a><\/div><\/article>

\"A<\/span><\/a>

Putting the trust boundary beside the reader.<\/a><\/h2>

2026<\/span><\/p>

A SAM can keep master keys out of reader firmware and perform card protocols locally. The security result still depends on permissions, host integration and lifecycle.<\/p>\n<\/div>read more...<\/a><\/div><\/article>

\"A<\/span><\/a>

The token is the easy part.<\/a><\/h2>

2026<\/span><\/p>

A token can replace a sensitive value. The difficult work is defining what the replacement means, who may reverse it and how the system behaves over time.<\/p>\n<\/div>read more...<\/a><\/div><\/article>

\"A<\/span><\/a>

The SIM as a cryptographic computer.<\/a><\/h2>

2026<\/span><\/p>

Long before the secure element became a general platform, SIM and UICC applets provided a small governed environment for keys, authentication and digital signatures.<\/p>\n<\/div>read more...<\/a><\/div><\/article>

\"A<\/span><\/a>

Designing a fare token for intermittent connectivity.<\/a><\/h2>

2026<\/span><\/p>

When balance and fare rules remain in a central account, a QR code is not the ticket. It is a compact claim whose meaning depends on connectivity, trust and replay control.<\/p>\n<\/div>read more...<\/a><\/div><\/article>

\"Shattered<\/span><\/a>

Keys without a secure boundary.<\/a><\/h2>

2026<\/span><\/p>

When cryptographic operations must run without an HSM, software can reduce the exposure of key material\u2014but it cannot make a hostile host trustworthy.<\/p>\n<\/div>read more...<\/a><\/div><\/article><\/div>